patches or wrappers. One problem with this is that rsync was not
written with this in mind and wasn't very careful about possible stack
overflows etc which could lead to security breaches. This wasn't a
problem when run in the traditional way as any user that can run rsync
can login anyway and cause much more damage that way.
This patch attempts to close possible stack overflow problems. I've
checked for all strcpy(), strcat(), sprintf() and memcpy()
overflows. I would appreciate it if someone else with a devious mind
could also go through the rsync source code and see if there are any
other stack overflows possible. Let me know if you do.
- by popular demand I have changed the behaviour of the --delete
option. It should now work as "expected" for even those people silly
enough not to read the man page. rsync will now only look for
candidate files/directories to delete in directories that are
explicitly transferred from the sender
- updated the README a bit
- try to fail a bit more gracefully when rsync runs out of disk
space. I don't think this issues is fully resolved yet
suggested on the list recently. See the man page entry for details but
basically it changes the behaviour so that paths are not stripped,
thus allowing you to specify a single rsync command to sync lots of
directories/files while preserving the full path name of each file.
also fixed a bug in the handling of umasks when both the source and
destination machines are local. We need to reset the umask before the
exec to ensure that the child gets a correct umask.
- handle directory ownership and permissions much better.
- fix bug where links caused the permissions of files to be
set incorrectly
- override the default umask in setting file permissions
- better handling -o and -D being passed to non-root users
- handle rsync to a destination of /
- fix the handling of mismatched file types at either end of the
link. For example, if the destination is a link and the source is not.
